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Abstract: 
The paper approaches the Eurozone crisis as an opportunity for a stronger communicative 
involvement of national parliaments in European governance. In this context, the paper 
explores links between structures of argumentative justification and party political 
polarization in debates on the Eurozone crisis. The question addressed is in how far we 
observe generalizable patterns across very different cases and legislatures. Empirically, 
the paper presents an assessment of data on argumentative claims from four European 
legislatures (the Austrian Nationalrat, French Assemblee Nationale, German Bundestag 
and UK House of Commons). This data demonstrates that aside from some unsurprising 
differences in the structure of debate in the four countries, we can actually observe 
typical patterns of contestation across legislatures that differ along various levels of 
argumentative discourse. Debates on the utility, normative principles and legitimacy of 
Eurozone crisis management can be identified across all four cases, each resulting in 
characteristic patterns of party political polarization.  
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1. Introduction: The Eurozone crisis as a trigger of involvement for national parliaments 
 
The outbreak and political resolution of the Eurozone crisis is generally described as a 
development that has weakened and marginalized parliaments, both at the European and 
the national level. In this sense, many observers have deplored the turn towards an 
intergovernmentalist mode of decision-making through the European Council, the 
increased influence of technocratic governance through the European Central Bank and 
authorities such as the EFSF and ESM, and the rise of a new mode of political 
cooperation characterized as “executive federalism” (Fabbrini 2013, Habermas 2013). 
Concerning the role of national parliaments in European governance, this argument may 
be plausible but also one-sided. Major initiatives to resolve the Eurozone crisis did not 
emanate from national parliaments but from political executives and technocratic 
institutions such as the European Central Bank. However, it should also not be 
overlooked that the Eurozone crisis has established various strong incentives for national 
parliaments to engage in a closer involvement into European affairs. Three arguments can 
be made to support this view: First, through the Eurozone crisis the overall salience of 
European governance has arguably grown, resulting in a far greater pressure by the public 
on parliaments to debate and scrutinize decisions on the Eurozone crisis. This is an 
important argument against the observation that the lack of political salience of European 
affairs works as an incentive to parliamentarians not to enact formally existing, 
potentially very strong scrutiny rights (Raunio 2010, 2011). Second, the Eurozone crisis 
has established various occasions where national parliaments were directly involved into 
decision-making as potential veto players – namely, through the requirement of passing 
ratification votes to enact credit assistance programs for crisis countries and to give 
authorization for the establishment of institutional innovations such as the European 
Stability Mechanism or TSCG (the so-called “Fiscal Compact”). The chance for national 
parliament to introduce substantial political changes into these decisions in hindisght may 
be low. However, these authorization votes nevertheless establish a strong incentive for a 
greater communicative involvement of parliaments into decision-making. The ESM and 
Greek ‘rescue packages’ may have been passed through large majorities in the German 
Bundestag and other national parliament, but nevertheless these decisions prompted 
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politically salient plenary debates (Wendler 2014a). In the context of intensive media 
coverage, such debates have been requiring government parties to justify their support for 
the management of the Eurozone crisis, and speakers of opposition parties to declare and 
explain their support or resistance for these measures (in relation to subsequent yes or no 
votes). In this context, the Eurozone crisis produced some of the first occasions where 
parliamentary debates on an issue of European governance produced major headline 
news in the Member States. Third, it should not be forgotten that a turn towards an 
intergovernmental mode of decision-making is institutionally related to a closer 
involvement of national parliaments. While a supranational mode of decision-making 
prescribes a strong involvement of the European Parliament as co-legislator of the 
Council of Ministers (and minimizes the role of domestic legislatures to involvement 
through the comparably weak Subsidiarity Procedure), most formal rights of involvement 
of national parliaments appear designed to work within an intergovernmental mode of 
integration – namely, through the scrutiny, control and potentially authorization of 
national executives as the primary agents of European decision-making (Raunio 2011, 
Hefftler et al. 2014). A good part of this involvement may be felt not through political 
intervention but the communicative involvement of national parliaments: As the political 
relevance of meetings of the European Council and Eurozone group grows, it becomes 
standard procedure for heads of government and senior ministers to make declarations to 
parliaments prior to these meetings, inviting responses and debate from all parliamentary 
actors.  
 
Considering these points, the overall effect of the Eurozone crisis on the relationship 
between executive and legislative institutions could be more ambiguous than assumed by 
many observers: The political decision-making for the resolution of the Eurozone crisis 
has arguably turned towards a more clearly expressed intergovernmental mode that 
sidelines the European Parliament. However through this development, the incentives and 
opportunities for domestic parliaments to become involved in a closer scrutiny of their 
domestic executives enacting this mode of decision-making have also grown. Against this 
background, this paper adopts an approach that understands the Eurozone crisis primarily 
as an opportunity and incentive for a more active communicative involvement of national 
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parliaments in European governance, focusing on their function as arenas of discursive 
justification and contestation of decisions taken for the resolution of the Eurozone crisis. 
Few contributions to the large literature on the Europeanization of national parliaments 
have addressed the debating function of parliaments (Auel/Raunio 2013, Maatsch 2014, 
Wendler 2014b). 
 
Addressing the communicative function of national parliaments involves two dimensions 
of analysis: First, this perspective involves the analysis of discursive justifications for 
decisions and policies adopted for the resolution of the Eurozone crisis. This dimension 
implies questions about what kind of arguments are used to establish and contest 
justifications for decisions taken to address the crisis. This dimension of analysis links the 
investigation of parliamentary debates to discourse theoretical approaches of European 
integration, including the prominent model of discursive institutionalism (Sjursen 2009, 
Schmidt 2013, Diez Medrano 2010). Second, the public communication of parliaments 
towards national publics inevitably involves a dimension of public contestation and party 
political polarization. Parliamentary parties compete for public support and encounter 
strong political and institutional incentives in the parliamentary arena to contest and de-
legitimize arguments of competing political actors rather than to engage in a consensus-
oriented process of public deliberation. In this sense, the analysis of public debate by 
parliaments establishes a link to the literature on the party political contestation of 
European governance and EU politicization (Statham/Trenz 2013, de Wilde 2011). Taken 
together, this paper approaches the Eurozone crisis as a dual challenge for political party 
groups interacting in the parliamentary arena: to establish argumentative justifications for 
the approval or rejection of Eurozone crisis management policies, and to engage in 
political competition with each other towards the public through the mutual contestation 
and polarization of positions. In this context, the aim of this paper is to analyze the 
dimensions of justification and political polarization in relation to each other in a 
comparative perspective of four European legislatures. Is the result of increased debate in 
parliament a wide diversity of very different perspectives, or do we observe similar 
patterns of contestation of polarization across countries that can be related to familiar 
patterns of domestic party politics? To answer this question, the main question of this 
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paper relates to the connection between justification and polarization: The main question 
asked here to what degree we can observe the emergence of similar types of political 
discourse and patterns of contestation across four very different legislatures, and to what 
degree the depiction of debates on the Eurozone crisis results in a diversity of national 
perspectives and party political constellations.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds in three steps. The subsequent chapter explains the 
theoretical and analytical framework of the present analysis (ch.2). The following short 
section presents the data and method of the paper (ch.3) before the main part presents the 
empirical findings (ch.4), to be summarized in the conclusion (ch.5).  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
The task of this theoretical chapter is twofold. First, it aims at the presentation of an 
analytical framework to empirically describe and assess parliamentary debate within the 
two dimensions discussed at the outset – namely, with regard to structures of 
argumentative justification and political contestation. Second, the section presents a 
discussion on the links of both dimensions with each other, establishing hypotheses to be 
scrutinized in the comparative perspective of four different legislatures in EU Member 
States.  
 
Addressing the first task, this paper maps argumentative justifications of parliamentary 
speakers for and against Eurozone crisis policies by referring to a well-established 
discourse theoretical distinction between pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral types of 
justification (cp. Habermas 1991, Sjursen 2002, Helbling et al. 2010, Wendler 2014c). 
This threefold distinction will be used to categorize key arguments that are identified in 
the debates, and serves as a point of reference for the comparison of debates across cases. 
The distinction is not purely analytical. Applying the distinction between the three 
different types of argumentative justifications, we gain insights into the fundamental 
definitions that different speakers assign to the Eurozone crisis, and the proposed logic of 
action they apply for the justification of subsequent decisions and policies.  
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In this sense, pragmatic arguments are based on a simple principle of utility that measures 
the success or failure of political action in terms of the returns of decisions for gains in 
political, legal or economic resources. While pragmatic arguments measure decisions in 
terms of their effect on actor-specific assets such as political action capacity, economic 
gains or legal instruments, this type of argumentation does not engage with the 
justification or contestation of principled values or goals of political action underlying 
this assessment. The political logic of action proposed by pragmatic arguments is one 
based on the logic of consequentiality – political decisions make sense when they offer 
measurable gains in terms of pre-defined goals and interests. This type of argument is 
used for a problem-solving discourse that basically ignores more genuinely political 
questions about desirable goals and principles of collective decision-making.  
 
This dimension is addressed through ethical-political and moral types of argument. Both 
kinds of justification refer to a logic of appropriateness of political action by establishing 
arguments about what norms and values can be considered as acceptable norms of 
political decision-making and behavior. A crucial difference between both kinds of 
normative justification, however, consists in their reference to the social frame of 
reference in which justifications for normative arguments are made. In this sense, ethical-
political arguments are principled commitments to a norm of political action that is 
representative for a particular social or political group, and that stands in contrast to 
other, competing norms and values. It is inherent to this logic of justification that a given 
norm is declared as fundamental for the beliefs and values of a particular social group 
and seen as preferential to potentially conflicting norms. Moral types of justification, by 
contrast, establish a claim of universal agreement: A justification made on the basis of 
typical moral categories such as justice, fairness, legitimacy or responsibility is made 
with the argument that all participants of a discourse – regardless of their competing 
ethical convictions – can agree to this argument by reference to universally accepted 
principles of rationality and reciprocity. Put in a nutshell, ethical arguments describe what 
is good, whereas moral arguments describe what is fair. Reconstructing these types of 
justification uncovers levels of discourse on the Eurozone crisis that differ substantially 
from the pragmatic level of debate on utility and problem-solving. At the ethical-political 
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level, we address justifications in which speakers express fundamental normative beliefs 
about the right principles for the resolution of the crisis, and thus arguably a more 
fundamental level of political disagreement than at the pragmatic level. The most 
demanding and fundamental standard of justification is reached at the moral level – when 
speakers address decisions or policies used for the resolution of the Eurozone crisis as 
(un)just, (un)fair, (ir)responsible or (il)legitimate.  
 
The distinction between pragmatic, ethical and moral kinds of argument therefore opens 
up to comparative scrutiny of three aspects of the debate on the Eurozone crisis that were 
highlighted as relevant both by political and academic observers: the need for fast and 
pragmatic solutions to a severe crisis endangering on the EU’s major substantial 
achievenements, namely its common currency (Laursen 2014, Daianu 2014); the related 
debate on principles guiding crisis management policies as expressed by catchwords such 
as solidarity, competitiveness, austerity, and growth (Maatsch 2014, Crespy/Schmidt 
2014); and finally, the debate on the Eurozone crisis as a crisis of justice and democracy 
(Crum 2013, Habermas 2013).  
 
As discussed above, the aim of this paper is not just to map these different dimensions of 
the Eurozone crisis but to relate their appearance in parliamentary discourse to the 
process of political contestation and polarization in public debates of legislatures. To 
conceptualize this interaction dimension, it appears necessary to systematize the 
incentives prompting parliamentary speakers to take positions in relation to Eurozone 
crisis management policies.  
 
To describe incentives, it appears helpful to relate to the three basic modes of 
representation and decision-making of European governance that are discussed in the 
growing literature on political representation in the EU: namely, an intergovernmental, 
supranational, and demoi-based mode (cp. Bellamy/Castiglione 2012, Kroeger/Friedrich 
2013). None of these modes of decision-making is exclusive in the EU; in contrast, one 
of the defining characteristics of the EU multi-level system is that it combines and 
balances all three modes in its processes of decision-making, representation, and 
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legitimization. As I will argue below, the role of national parliaments within European 
governance can equally not be reduced to one of these modes, as sometimes observed in 
the literature when national parliaments are identified with a demoi-based element of 
representation (Cooper 2011). Instead, I argue that all three modes suggest models of 
political community in Europe that parliamentary speakers refer to in their statements, 
and that establish different incentives for their political interaction and polarization.  
 
First, an intergovernmental mode of decision-making between domestic executives 
interacting at the supranational level is central to European integration and has been 
strengthened through the Eurozone crisis according to many observers. National 
parliaments are not absent from, but an integral element of this mode of decision-making. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that from its earliest stages, the involvement of national 
parliaments into European governance was institutionalized through mechanisms of 
scrutiny, control and potential mandating towards domestic executives (and only to a 
very limited extent through transnational networks and direct exchanges with 
supranational institutions, cp. Raunio 2009, Hefftler et al. 2014). Even at the current 
stage, the primary way of involvement of legislatures is through the provision of 
information and scrutiny procedures towards national governments, enacted mostly by 
European affairs and sectoral committees. Considering incentives for the interaction of 
parliamentary actors, this representative role of national parliaments prescribes almost by 
definition an antagonism of the government majority and the parliamentary opposition: 
As pointed out in a much-cited article on the Europeanization of parliaments, the 
institutional antagonism between representatives of the executive and legislative branch 
is highly likely to be outweighed by the politically far more salient polarization between 
the government majority and opposition (Auel/Benz 2005). As discussed at the outset, the 
more strongly pronounced political role of the European Council for the resolution of the 
Eurozone crisis and perception of a sidelining of the European Commission and 
European Parliament are likely to reinforce this form of parliamentary interaction. 
Debates and parliamentary interactions are therefore very likely to follow a pattern of 
polarization between government and opposition.  
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In comparison to this first type, a supranational mode of representation and decision-
making is more difficult to relate to the role of national parliaments in the context of 
European governance. Within this mode, political community is imagined as a pan-
European demos with a shared public sphere and identity that engages in joint decision-
making through representation in institutions representing the transnational European 
citizenry as a whole. Arguably the European Parliament, instead of national legislatures, 
is the key institution representing this perspective on representation in the European 
Union (Hix/Noury/Gerard 2009). From this point of view, a supranational frame of 
reference can be expected to be far weaker in the deliberations and self-understanding of 
parliamentarians than one that is focused primarily on the domestic polity. However, it 
should not be dismissed as necessarily absent from parliamentary debate. More than 
many other developments of European governance, the Eurozone crisis has highlighted 
the interdependence between Member States of the Eurozone and beyond, and brought to 
the fore debates about principles and instruments of fiscal and economic governance for 
the entire Eurozone to address the financial and economic crisis (Maatsch 2014, 
Crespy/Schmidt 2014, Wendler 2014a). These developments and decisions go beyond the 
national level and relate to debates about transnational developments and modes of 
governance. Addressing these topics, parliamentary speakers therefore locate themselves 
in a different context of institutional and political incentive structures than in the 
intergovernmental mode: At the forefront of this perspective is no longer the scrutiny of 
actions by the national executive but the debate on competing policy choices and 
interdependence effects between Member States of the Eurozone. The most important 
political action incentive described for the intergovernmental dimension – namely, the 
support or criticism of an incumbent government that is accountable to parliament – is 
absent at this level. When referring to the supranational dimension of decision-making, 
parliamentary interactions are therefore more likely to become polarized along competing 
ideological convictions of parliamentary speakers and party groups. The polarization of 
parties within the left/right dimension of market freedom vs. state regulation is likely to 
be more prominent when supranational developments are addressed within debates of 
national parliaments (cp. Hooghe et al. 2004, Statham et al. 2010). It should be added that 
a supranational mode of decision-making excludes a second dimension of political 
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conflict discussed for European politics, namely, the dimension of debate about the 
balance between national sovereignty and supranationalism. By definition, a 
supranational mode of debate and decision-making assumes a political space and 
conception of political community beyond the national level, addressing modes of 
governance for this level but not its very boundaries.  
 
This latter aspect of debate is addressed within the third, demoi-based mode of 
representation and decision-making (Mueller 2010). At the basis of this conception is the 
association of national polities as self-governing entities with strong bonds of civic 
solidarity and public debate that relate to each other in a wider European framework. 
Within this conception, the role of national parliaments extends beyond the scrutiny of 
executives interacting at the supranational level to the role of a public arena representing 
the citizenry and enacting their democratic self-governance. An aspect of European 
governance that moves to the forefront in this conception is a process of public debate 
and democratic decision-making about the delimitation between the autonomy of the 
respective Member States and rules and institutions established for their mutual 
association with each other in a ‘polity of polities’. In the context of the Eurozone crisis, 
the delimitation between the principles of national sovereignty and supranational 
integration moved to the forefront of debates and decisions primarily through ratification 
votes. With these votes, parliaments were asked to authorize new European institutions 
such as the European Stability Mechanism, or to legitimize the imposition of constraints 
on the sovereignty of other Member States in the framework of European credit 
assistance programs. These authorization votes are not enacted merely as an act of 
scrutiny towards domestic governments, as potential vetoes have consequences for the 
adoption of institutional innovations in the entire Eurozone. They are also not be equated 
with a choice of policy instruments within the supranational dimension but concern the 
assignment of rights of self-governance, and the pooling of sovereignty at the level of the 
supranational polity. In this dimension, political conflicts within the 
sovereignty/integration dimension therefore move to the forefront of political interactions 
much clearer than within the other two modes of representation. Beyond the 
intergovernmental model, this act of decision-making involves a process of open public 
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debate and involves all parliamentary parties. The authorization role of national 
parliaments in European decision-making is therefore only adequately captured from the 
perspective of a demoi-based model of representation and decision-making.  
 
To summarize, it was argued that national parliaments relate to three modes of political 
decision-making that each encourage a particular form of interaction between 
parliamentary actors: first, an intergovernmental mode privileging government/opposition 
politics, a supranational mode related to the ideological polarization of parties along the 
left/right dimension, and a demoi-based mode encouraging interactions within the 
integration/sovereignty mode of political conflict.  
 
The theoretical arguments discussed so far mainly aim at establishing an analytical 
framework for the mapping and assessment of parliamentary debates in two dimensions – 
argumentative justification and political polarization. Beyond empirical description, the 
paper also aims at the investigation of links between these two dimensions. It is expected 
that the patterns of political polarization discussed above do not occur in a random form 
but to different degrees and in specific connections with the three types of argumentative 
justification outlined here. In this sense, we expect the following connections between the 
spheres of justification and polarization (for this see also Wendler 2014b,c): 
 
- First, as discussed above, pragmatic arguments and justifications are almost by 
definition non-ideological but based on the utility of decisions or policies towards 
pre-defined goals or interests. These arguments are therefore easily adjusted to 
particular roles and strategic behaviors adopted by political actors in the 
parliamentary arena, independently of the ideological affiliation of political 
parties. In parliamentary procedure the antagonism between government majority 
and opposition is arguably the strongest incentive for such behaviors. Pragmatic 
justifications are therefore expected to resonate strongly with this mode of 
interaction. Hence it is expected that pragmatic justifications are contested 
primarily through patterns of government/opposition politics (H1).  
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- Second, ethical-political argument relate to the justification of decisions on the 
basis of a principled commitment to specific values and norms that are presented 
as intrinsically desirable in comparison and contrast to other, competing values. It 
is expected that this mode of debate resonates more strongly with the ideological 
affiliation of parties, particularly along the left-right spectrum (H2); 
 
- Finally, moral arguments and justifications relate most closely to the concept of 
legitimacy. Norms of legitimacy, however, arguably differ strongly in relation to 
specific national contexts and understandings of the domestic polity in relation to 
supranational integration, as suggested widely in the literature (cp. Schmidt 
2009). It can therefore be expected that moral types of justification prompt more 
country-specific patterns of polarization and resonate more strongly with the 
integration/sovereignty dimension of political debate (H3).    
 
- Beyond these connections between types of discourse and political polarization, 
we also expect the interaction of parliamentary groups within a 
government/opposition mode to be the strongest across legislatures, as it is 
strongly institutionalized, politically salient and encouraged through the rise of 
intergovernmental modes of decision-making during the Eurozone crisis (H4).  
 
- Finally, we expect the mode of government/opposition politics to occur in the 
most universal form across legislatures as this mode of interaction is found in all 
domestic legislatures. Patterns of left/right politics are expected to differ more 
strongly according to specific domestic party political constellations, whereas the 
occurrence of a sovereignty/integration mode depends on the presence of 
Eurosceptic parties that are found only in some of the cases. 
Government/opposition politics is therefore expected to be more generalizable as 
a mode of interaction than left/right politics and pro-/anti-EU polarization (H5).  
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3. Cases, method and data 
 
This case study compares parliamentary debates in the preiod between 2009 and 2012 in 
four very different legislatures: the Austrian Nationalrat, the French Assemblee 
Nationale, the German Bundestag and the UK House of Commons. This case selection 
combines a very heterogenous mix of cases, as it concludes arena and transformative 
legislatures, countries inside and outside the Eurozone, cases with and without the 
presence of populist right Eurosceptic parties (A), and different degrees of fragmentation 
and polarization. Furthermore, during the period of analysis different constellations of 
government and opposition parties are found, including a Grand Coalition government 
(A), two center-right coalitions (D/UK), and one center-right government politically 
affiliated to a presidential executive (F). This heterogenity of cases is intentional. The 
aim of this paper is not to use the variation in independent variables to track differences 
in communicative responses but to ask whether broadly generalizable patterns of debate 
can be traced between very different cases.  
 
The method used here is based on claims-making analysis (Koopmans/Statham 2010) and 
data collection through computer-based manual coding of the transcripts of plenary 
debates dealing with European governance. This data is part of a bigger research project 
in which a wide variety of thematic areas are explored (Wendler 2014b). Here, the subset 
of argumentative claims dealing with EMU during the time frame stated above were 
drawn from the larger data base. As the subsequent sections will demonstrate, claims 
coded in this thematic category were reviewed both qualitatively and quantitatively to 
investigate links between the structure of argumentative justification and patterns of 
political polarization in the debates under analysis.  
 
4. Justification: Core arguments in parliamentary debates about the Eurozone crisis 
 
The task of the subsequent section is mainly descriptive. The aim is to give an overview 
of the main content of the debates coded for the present analysis, and to demonstrate 
which kinds of claim were categorized in the three different dimensions of discourse 
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distinguished at the outset. Apart from discussing content and levels of discourse, another 
aim to give an overview of the degree of contention of different parts of the debate.  
 
Overall 2540 argumentative claims from parliamentary debates in the four legislatures 
under comparison were coded for this analysis. Just under half of these claims were 
coded as pragmatic (1141) while slightly more were categorized as norms-based (1399). 
Moreover, in both argumentative dimensions just over half of the claims were coded as 
positive or affirmative and close to half as critical (585/456 for the pragmatic dimension, 
and 731/669 for the normative dimension). Considering both observations, two 
conclusions can be drawn about the structure of the empirical material considered here: 
First, that debates on the Eurozone crisis are (unsurprisingly) very contested and 
therefore offer insights into the evolution of political contention on European governance. 
Second, that the structure of claims is balanced enough across different argumentative 
dimensions to compare levels and forms of political polarization.  
 
In order to provide insights into the actual argumentative content of debates, the review 
of the empirical data was undertaken in two steps. First, during the initial coding process 
each argumentative claim was assigned either to different types of pragmatic justification 
(related to gains or losses in economic, legal or political resources) or normative 
argument (related to ethical statements about collective identity or political values, or 
moral standards of justice and legitimacy). Each group of claims was subsequently 
reviewed to create broad groups of argument made in each category, summarized and 
numbered in the following categories: economic resources (ER), political resources (PR), 
collective identity (CI), social values (SV), and moral standards (MS). These ‘core 
arguments’ were created separately for positive/affirmative and negative or critical 
statements in the debate. The table below provides an overview of all of these core 
arguments in the four legislatures compared.  
 
(table 1 on core arguments in debates on the Eurozone crisis) 
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The discussion of this qualitative overview cannot go into very much detail here. 
However, a simple observation is that unsurprising national differences aside, some core 
arguments and debates can be traced across different legislatures. For the pragmatic 
dimension, an important observation is that arguments based on economic criteria are 
important but in no way exclusive to this debate. A substantial part of pragmatic 
justification relates to more genuinely political concerns – considering the Eurozone 
crisis as an opportunity for institutional reform in the positive dimension, and criticisms 
of the coherence and effectiveness of government leadership and EU decision-making in 
the negative dimension.  
 
Within the normative dimension of debate, only few claims were coded as statements 
based on ideas on identity. Most evidence of this kind of claim was found in the German 
debate, where a substantial amount of claims are made that principles of stability and 
austerity resonate with genuinely German understandings of economic governance and 
are engrained in the development of postwar Germany. The remainder of claims in the 
ethical dimension covers claims based on a commitment to social values, mostly 
expressing a principled commitment or rejection of the stability paradigm and budget 
restraint (SV+1 vs SV-1), appraising or criticizing principles of economic management 
inherent to Eurozone governance and the regulation of the financial sector (SV+3 vs. SV-
2), and the principled endorsement or rejection of the Euro as a symbol of 
supranationalism (SV+2 vs SV-3). Within the moral dimension of debate, similar pairs of 
positive and critical arguments can be identified. First, a substantial amount of claims 
refers to the moral category of responsibility, either affirming or rejecting the claim that 
Eurozone government act in responsible ways towards each other and their respective 
domestic constituencies (MS+1 vs MS-1). A second, positive moral argument that is 
particularly strong in the German debate is one based on the idea of reciprocity – that 
credit assistance programs can only be offered as a sign of solidarity in exchange for 
efforts at economic and budgetary reform of recipient countries (MS+2). The remainder 
of arguments in the moral dimension is biased towards critical arguments. Positive 
statements that the decision-making of crisis management for the Eurozone is fair (with 
regard to voting rights, transparency, accountability, etc., MS+3) is countered by three 
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negative arguments criticizing the questionable legal base of decisions (MS-2), a 
democratic deficit of decision-making (MS-3), an unfair distribution of burdens between 
the public and private sector (MS-4), and claims criticizing governments of a lack of 
political integrity and corruption (ie, ‘governments being bought by banks’, MS-5). 
Overall this review reflects a good deal of political contention on the management of the 
Eurozone crisis. How patterns of political polarization evolve in these various 
argumentative dimensions presented here is the task of the next section.  
 
5. Polarization: Patterns of party positions in debates of national parliaments 
 
In the subsequent discussion, the polarization of parliamentary parties is assessed in 
relation to two criteria. First, an important aspect of a party position is the degree or 
emphasis to which a certain topic, argument or type of discourse is emphasized in 
parliamentary debate. To asssess this dimension, the subsequent analysis considers 
emphasis scores (ES) of parliamentary parties, calculated as the relative percentage to 
which the speakers of a parliamentary group used a specific kind of argument in relation 
to all their statements. For example, if 20 out of 100 arguments made by the speakers of 
one parliamentary group used an ethical type of justification, the emphasis score would 
be 0.2. Second, parliamentary parties obviously create political contestation and 
polarization by taking opposite stances towards particular topics and within the different 
kinds of parliamentary discourse. To assess this dimension, the subsequent analysis 
considers position scores (PS) of parties, calculated as the relative amount of positive 
statements in relation to all statements made by the parliamentary party within the 
respective level of discourse. For example, if 5 out of the 20 ethical statements made by a 
party group were positive and the rest negative, the position score would be 0.25. This 
measurement allows to map party positions on given issues, but also to identify ‘leaders’ 
of positive and critical discourse in the case of parties with very high emphasis scores. 
Combining both values, a case of strong polarization is found when emphasis scores are 
high, and a wide distance found in the position scores of two (groups of) parties. A more 
conditional type of polarization is found when parties differ only in emphasis, or if 
different position scores are combined with one party strongly de-emphasizing an issue.  
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The position and emphasis scores for all parliamentary parties compared in this paper are 
presented in the subsequent table. For better readability, score rank orders were entered 
into the table, listing all values in descending order from highest to lowest. From this 
overview, we can establish an overview of position patterns of parliamentary parties in 
debates on the Eurozone crisis across all four legislatures (cp. table 1). 
 
(table 2, emphasis and position scores of parties) 
 
NOTE: The final version of the paper and the talk at the conference will most likely use 
two-dimensional scatter plots to discuss party positions, but they cannot yet be included 
here in the paper, FW 
 
An initial observation about this data is that across legislatures and levels of discourse, a 
polarization between government and opposition parties is generally a correct description 
of interactions in the parliamentary arena. Both within the pragmatic and norms-based 
dimensions of discourse (including its subcategories of ethical and moral argument), the 
position scores of parties in government office are above those of parties in the 
parliamentary opposition. The only exception to this pattern is the British Conservative 
party, which in spite of holding government office during the period of analysis shows 
position scores closer to the camp of opposition parties. This outlier position is 
unsurprising given the well-established Eurosceptic position of the Conservatives and 
Britain’s non-membership of the Eurozone. In this context, the fact that the position score 
of the UK Tories is still above the more Europhile British Labour Party and other 
opposition parties considered as supportive of European integration (such as the German 
SPD) actually strengthens the observation that government or opposition status strongly 
influences the direction of statements in the parliamentary arena, even about a question of 
supranational governance. In comparison, neither the ideological profile of parties along 
the left/right dimension nor their general attitude towards European integration appears in 
an equally strong and clear way as the government/opposition divide. This confirms our 
expectation that the interaction between the government majority and opposition sets 
very strong incentives for how parties take political stances in parliamentary debate.  
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In addition, it is noteworthy how strong the polarization of positions is within the divide 
between government and opposition parties. Across discursive dimensions, very few 
entries of parliamentary parties are found in the corridor between positions scores of 0.2 
and 0.8. The noteworthy exceptions to this observation are, again, the British 
Conservatives, the two green parties, and the French Nouveau Centre – an outlier 
probably explained by the relatively small N of statements for the latter parties. Entries 
for larger parties, in contrast, are always near position scores of 0 and 1, indicating a 
strong polarization in debates on the Eurozone crisis. In comparison, emphasis scores of 
parties differ widely across the spectrum and no ready generalizations can be made 
between government and opposition parties. More characteristic patterns of party 
polarization as described through position and emphasis scores can be identified in each 
of the three distinctive dimensions of discourse, as discussed in the remainder of this 
chapter.  
 
Pragmatic dimension of debate: Government vs opposition 
Within the pragmatic dimension of debate, two broad clusters of parties can be identified 
along two corridors of very low (0-0.2) and very high (0.8-1) values, with only a few 
outliers (the two Green parties and British Conservatives, as discussed above). The two 
clouds are populated entirely by parties in government (for high values) and opposition 
(for low values). In addition, a review of emphasis scores distinguishes this field from 
other levels of debate. As indicated by the emphasis scores, major mainstream parties 
have generally higher emphasis values than smaller and ideologically more radical 
parties. In this sense, the three leaders of positive discourse are all major government 
parties (SPO, UMP and OVP), whereas the leaders of critical course are also mainstream 
parties (LAB, CON, and SPD). Both radical left-parties (GDR, LINKE) and populist 
right parties (FPO, BZO) have lower position scores than mainstream parties (with the 
only exception being the SRC, which ranks behind the parties just mentioned in terms of 
emphasis). If polarization is measured as a combination of high emphasis values and 
strong variation in position scores, this field of debate is dominated by mainstream parties 
along the lines of government vs. opposition politics, while ideologically more radical 
parties are remarkably withdrawn from this dimension of the debate.  
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Normative dimension of debate: Ideological polarization of parliamentary parties 
A different pattern of contestation between parliamentary parties is found at the level of 
normative discourse. Again, position scores are polarized between two groups of parties 
in government office and parliamentary opposition (with the notable exception of the 
British Conservatives). However, the leadership of both positive and negative norms-
based discourse is assumed by different sets of parties. The positive leadership of moral 
discourse on the Eurozone crisis – stating that crisis management measures and the 
institutional reform of Eurozone governance are appropriate, just and legitimate – is 
assumed by an ideologically coherent set of center-right and liberal parties. All position 
scores of these parties are near or identical with 1, while emphasis scores range between 
0.85 to 0.51 (including FDP, LD, CDU, CSU, UMP and OVP in descending order). The 
only center-left party near this cluster (the Austrian SPO) has a far lower emphasis score 
of .481. The mainstream center-right is therefore clearly identified as the protagonist of a 
strong positive norms-based discourse. In this context, it might be added that the 
allegedly technical and pragmatic discourse of the German CDU was coded as consisting 
of about two thirds of norms-based claims, particularly those emphasizing the value of 
stability and reciprocity of credit assistance and reform efforts. The critical counterpart of 
this discourse coalition is a group of far-left parties (B90, GDR, and LINKE) near a 
position score of zero and very high emphasis values (above 0.9). Almost the entire 
parliamentary discourse of these parties consists of a strongly critical normative argument 
against the appropriateness and fairness of Eurozone crisis management. This group of 
left parties is even more clearly identified as a leader of critical discourse than populist 
right parties, whose position score is equally low but combined with less emphasis. A 
curious element is that the center-left parties (SPD, LAB, SPO, and SRC) have relatively 
low emphasis scores (rank orders 16, 18, 15, and 6, respectively) while their position 
scores are scattered across the spectrum of debate. According to our data, center-left 
parties are torn between reluctant normative support in government office (SPO) and 
more ambivalent (SRC) or even a highly critical (LAB, SPD) discourse from 
parliamentary opposition. Nevertheless the normative level of debate is more easily 
characterized as one influenced by an ideological characterization of parties. A strongly 
positive discourse of the center-right interacts with a strongly critical discourse of far-left, 
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and a more conditionally critical discourse of center-left parties. More insight into the 
structure of this dimension of debate is gained from a distinction of statements in the 
ethical-political and moral level of argumentative justification.  
 
The mapping of party positions at the level of ethical justifications resembles the overall 
pattern of normative discourse in many ways, with the main difference that the presence 
of far-left parties as leaders of a critical discourse is less clearly present. Again, all 
center-right and liberal parties except for the British Conservatives appear as proponents 
of a positive value-based discourse on Eurozone rescue policies (identified within a 
corridor of position scores between 0.8 and 1), with the two liberal parties (FDP and LD) 
unsurprisingly leading in emphasis before the center-right (CSU, CDU, UMP, OVP). 
This group of parties is opposed to a cluster of parties expressing a strongly critical 
discourse (identified within a corridor of position scores between 0 and 0.2) that is led by 
three left-wing parties (B90, LINKE, Gruene) in about the same range of emphasis scores 
as the liberal/center-right leaders of positive discourse. Two center-left parties join this 
cluster of parties with critical stances, opposing themselves to two center-right parties 
(UMP, CDU) with about the same emphasis score but diametrically opposed position 
scores. This almost perfect image of polarization along the left/right spectrum is only 
confused by the presence of the two populist right parties (BZO, FPO) within the cluster 
of critical left-wing parties. However, their emphasis scores are comparably low (rank 
orders for the emphasis scores of both parties are 13 and 18, respectively). This level of 
debate is therefore dominated by a very polarized debate between center-right/liberal and 
left-wing parties, mostly in relation to paradigms of economic governance associated 
with the catchwords of ‘stability’ versus ‘growth’.  
 
The polarization of parties takes a different shape at the level of moral discourse. Three 
observations stand out. First, the polarization of parties as measured through their 
polarization scores is extremely strong at this level (only one entry is found in the 
corridor between position scores of 0.2 and 0.8, while 12 parliamentary parties have 
position scores of either 0 or 1). As a result of this polarization, two clusters of parties 
with either very positive or critical positions can be identified.  
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Second, the polarization between left- and right-wing parties described above is more 
lopsided and ambiguous than at the ethical level. The emphasis score of parties within the 
cluster of critical parties reaches far higher values, establishing five parties of both the 
far-left and populist right as the leaders of a critical discourse against the legitimacy and 
justice of Eurozone crisis policies (in a descending order of emphasis scores, these parties 
are LINKE, GDR, FPO, B90, and BZO). These parties oppose themselves to a set of 
mainstream parties defending a positive discourse on the legitimacy of Eurozone 
governance. This group of parties unsurprisingly includes the two German parties in 
government (FDP, CDU) but also other mainstream parties in government office (SPO, 
UMP, NC and OVP). Setting these two groups of parties in relation with each other 
confirms the assumption of a ‘Inverted U’ polarization of parties between mainstream 
and ideologically more extreme parties. In comparison, both left/right and 
government/opposition patterns of polarization appear less plausible as an explanation at 
this level. Center-left parties in parliamentary opposition (SPD, LAB, SRC) have very 
low position scores but also far lower emphasis scores than the cluster of parties 
identified as the leaders of critical discourse. Mainstream parties with very critical 
positions towards the legitimacy of Eurozone governance are found within the data set, 
and interestingly both in government (CON) and opposition (SPD, LAB). Their criticism, 
however, is far more withdrawn at this level in comparison to political parties at the left 
and right fringes of the political spectrum.  
 
Third, and finally, strong country-specific differences in the polarization of parties are 
actually found. All three British parties are clustered in a distanced and critical response 
that combines very low position and low emphasis scores, whereas both France and 
Austria show much clearer signs of polarization. The most surprising finding is probably 
that the German debate is the most strongly polarized, involving both leaders of positive 
discourse (CDU, FDP) and two of the four leader parties of critical discourse (LINKE, 
B90). The debate on the fairness and legitimacy of crisis management and institutional 
reform of the Eurozone was more contentious in Germany than acknowledged by many 
observers (for a more detailed discussion of this point, cp. also Wendler 2014a).  
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6. Conclusion 
 
In summation, this paper aims at adding insight into domestic parliamentary contention 
about the Eurozone crisis, both with regard to the substantive content of debates and 
emerging patterns of party political polarization. The main question was whether 
expectable differences in national debates aside, we can identify broadly similar patterns 
of justification and polarization across very different political settings and legislatures. In 
the overall picture, many observations from this case study confirm this expectation. 
First, it was shown that within levels of the debate dealing with the utility, principles and 
legitimacy of Eurozone governance several core arguments can be traced that occur 
across different countries and legislatures. Second, it was shown that different 
argumentative dimensions are related to characteristic patterns of political polarization 
between parties. Normative contention on Eurozone crisis management policies is strong, 
and it includes both a dimension on values and paradigms of economic governance and a 
debate on the democratic legitimacy and fairness of crisis resolution policies. Whereas 
the former debate evolves primarily between representatives of left and right parties, the 
legitimacy of efforts to stabilize the Eurozone is contested from boththe left and right 
against a somewhat defensive mainstream – and the degree of contention is actually 
strongest in one of the epicenters of decision-making, namely the German parliament.  
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